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THNGS JUDGES DO: STATE STATUTORY
INTERPRETATION*
Judith S. Kaye
Author's Note: I am especially pleased to be a part of an issue
dedicated to Judge Richard D. Simons. As the Court of Appeals'
two "junior judges" in 1983-Judge Simons went on the Court in
January 1983, I followed in September-we established a bond
that will endure forever, learning together the wondrous ways of
a great institution and enjoying the ensuing years in the
privileged position of colleagues and friends. Having shared with
Judge Simons a dozen years around the Court's Conference
Table and the dinner table (during Albany Sessions, the judges
dine together), what emerges for me is the picture of an
exemplary judge and an extraordinary human being. This article
focuses on only one Simons opinion-Cahill v. Rosa.1 So many
of his writings are textbook examples of tie judicial craft at its
best.
In anticipation of my visit to Touro, your Dean wisely and
thoughtfully sent me fascinating videotapes of two of my
predecessors at this "Distinguished Jurist" podium. First, I
watched Judge Alex Kozinski describe his experiences sharing
pizza with Justice Antonin Scalia-I believe Judge Kozinski has
done a scholarly piece on the subject. And then I watched the
* This article is based on remarks delivered at Touro College Jacob D.
Fuchsberg Law Center on April 10, 1997 as part of the Distinguished Jurist m
Residence Program. I am most grateful for the superb assistance of my Law
Clerk Jeremy R. Feinberg in the preparation of this article.
1. 89 N.Y.2d 14, 674 N.E.2d 274, 651 N.Y.S.2d 344 t1996); see infra
text accompanying notes 57-61.
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pizza connoisseur himself. Talk about food for thought! Even the
mention of those lectures leaves me lusting for pizza. So I'd like
to join the party--regrettably not the culinary feast but the
intellectual one.
Three years ago, Judge Kozinski called his speech "Things
Judges Say. "2 Today, picking up where he left off, I would like
to call my remarks "Things Judges Do." Then you'll have a
complete picture: what judges say, what they do and what they
eat.
As you all know, judges make and shape the law by developing
the common law and interpreting statutes and constitutions.
That's the easy part. How they do it is considerably more
difficult.
In his lecture, Judge Kozinski described how judges interpret
contracts under common law principles. He concluded that judges
can make the words of a contract say just about anything. He
called it "wresting ambiguity from the jaws of clarity. "3 Judge
Kozinski concluded that when judges let lawyers persuade them
to interpret contracts in a manner contrary to the normal sense of
the words, the bargaining process becomes meaningless and the
contract merely a precursor to litigation--obviously a very bad
result. He called on lawyers and judges to respect the importance
of legal instruments and find ways to give their words meaning
other than as a gateway to litigation.
The very next year, Justice Scalia offered a variation on the
theme in describing considerations involved in interpreting the
United States Constitution. 4 He warned against treating the
Constitution as a living document, capable of changing and
reacting to the course of time. Doing so, Justice Scalia argued,
2. Remarks of Judge Alex Kozinski, Distinguished Jurist In Residence
Program, Touro College Jacob D. Fuchsberg Law Center, March 16, 1994.
3. Judge Kozinski explained that judges can rely on canons of
construction (such as narrowly interpreting exceptions), or elemental principles
of fairness (like construing language against the drafter), or examining the
circumstances under which the contract was written (such as duress and
contracts of adhesion). Id.
4. Remarks of Justice Antonin Scalia, Distinguished Jurist In Residence
Program, Touro College Jacob D. Fuchsberg Law Center, October 18, 1995.
596 [Vol 13
2
Touro Law Review, Vol. 13 [1997], No. 3, Art. 3
https://digitalcommons.tourolaw.edu/lawreview/vol13/iss3/3
THINGS JUDGES DO
invites judges to use their own prejudices and biases in the
interpretation process and leads to rights never contemplated by
the drafters of the Constitution.
In supporting his argument, Justice Scalia claimed that the
logical end result of such practices is that federal judges will be
selected and confirmed based on their views on specific
constitutional issues rather than their general qualifications as
jurists. This, according to Justice Scalia, will lead to judges who
represent only the majority view on issues, and will erode the
protections of the Bill of Rights, which was created to protect
against the tyranny of the majority-again, obviously a very bad
result.
The message I distill from these talks is that you like your
pizza hot and crusty. So without attempting any rejoinder on
either Judge Kozinski's thesis regarding the common law or
Justice Scalia's on the United States Constitution, I'd like to
venture into the third area and talk about statutory interpretation,
especially state statutory interpretation.
Both of my predecessors here could also have added a lot of
spice on the subject of statutory interpretation, another area they
see where judges may be tempted--to use Judge Kozinski's
words--to wrest "ambiguity from the jaws of clarity." Their
views on this important subject are well known, and I might say
entirely consistent with the portrait they paint of appropriate
constitutional and common law decisionmaking.
In his new book, A Matter of Interpretation: Federal Courts
and the Law,5 Justice Scalia estimates that constitutional
interpretation is at issue in barely one-fifth of the Supreme
Court's cases, and a mere one-twentieth if you exclude criminal
cases. 6 Overwhelmingly what federal judges do is interpret
federal statutes and federal regulations. 7 The subject of statutory
5. ANTONIN SCALIA, A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION: FEDERAL COURTS
AND THE LAV (Princeton University Press 1997): see also Waher Barthold.
Book Review, N.Y. L.J., Mar. 25, 1997, at 2.
6. Id. at 13.
7. ERIC LANE and ABNER J. MIKVA, LEGISLATIVE PROCESs 763 t1995)
("In the age of statutes, their interpretation constitutes a major part of the
1997]
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interpretation, Justice Scalia noted, "is the principal business of
judges and (hence) lawyers.",8
Statutory interpretation is a familiar topic for me too. Like the
Supreme Court--indeed, even more so--the New York Court of
Appeals docket is dominated by statutory interpretation cases.
And because statutes today reach into every crevice of our lives,
the array is amazing. Just last session, over a five-day period, the
Court heard cases involving the Family Court Act, 9 the Insurance
Law, 1 0 the Education Law, 11 the General Obligations Law, 12 the
Labor Law, 13 the Penal Law, and of course the Civil Practice
Law and Rules and the Criminal Procedure Law. 14 That wasn't
at all unusual. New York statutes and regulations, like their
federal counterparts, take up most of the shelf space in my
chambers. With the process of enactment and revision going on
constantly, if we don't update our New York Code of Rules and
Regulations several times a month, we're in big trouble.
Given the modern "statutorification" of the law, 15 what is
surprising is the dearth of scholarly attention given to the subject
of statutory interpretation. Justice Scalia, in his book, identified
judicial function. This is evidenced by court dockets filled with cases
emanating from disputes over the meaning of statutory language.").
8. SCALIA, supra note 5, at 13-14.
9. N.Y. FAM. CT. ACT § 301.2(8)(vi) (McKinney 1983), in In re Manuel
R. (argued March 18, 1997).
10. N.Y. INS. LAW § 5106(a) (McKinney 1985), in Central General
Hospital v. Chubb Group of Insurance Companies (argued March 18, 1997).
11. N.Y. EDUC. LAW § 2509(1)(a) (McKinney 1995), in In re Speichler v.
BOCES (argued March 19, 1997).
12. N.Y. GEN. OBLIG. LAW § 5-322.1 (McKinney 1989), in Itri Brick &
Concrete Co. v. Aetna Casualty and Surety Co. and Stottlar v. Ginsburg Dev.
Corp. (argued March 25, 1997).
13. N.Y. LAB. LAW § 511(17) (McKinney 1988), in Matter of Killian v.
GMC (argued March 25, 1997).
14. E.g., N.Y. PENAL LAW § 240.20(3) (McKinney 1989), in People v.
Noel Tichenor (argued March 19, 1997); N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 670.10
(McKinney 1995) in People v. Jose Carracedo (argued March 24, 1997).
15. See GUIDO CALABRESI, A COMMON LAW FOR THE AGE OF STATUTES
1, 1 (1982) ("In [the last 50 to 80 years] we have gone from a legal system
dominated by the common law... to one in which statutes... have become
the primary source of law.").
[Vol 13598
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only one authoritative treatise devoted to the subject. 16 He
lamented the fact that rather than teaching first-year law students
about statutory interpretation, law schools teach about judges
who have shaped the common law. 17
Well, even less than a dearth of scholarly attention is paid to
state statutory interpretation. What little literature there is on the
subject tends, like Justice Scalia's book, to focus on how federal
courts read federal law. Few, if any, of the authors consider
whether there are issues distinctly germane to the interpretation
of state statutes. 18
Are there differences? I think there are, and I'd like to suggest
just a few of them.
STATE-FEDERAL DIFFERENCES
Perhaps the most basic difference is that there are far more
state statutory interpretation cases than federal. Why? There are
simply far more state cases. In New York alone, for example,
our state court system received a staggering 3.7 million new
filings just last year--more than ten times the federal filings
nationwide. 19 And we're only one of 50. Plainly. there is much
more statutory interpretation going on at the state court level.
16. Id. at 15 (referring to Sutherland's Statutes and Statutory
Construction). See also LANE and MIKVA, supra note 7 (devoting an extensive
section to statutory interpretation).
17. SCALIA, supra note 5, at 3-4, 15.
18. See Larry Kramer, The Lawmaking Power of the Federal Courts. 12
PACE L. REv. 263, 279 n.55 (1992) ("Contemporary scholars speak in general
terms and offer general solutions while in fact dealing only with a narrow set
of issues associated with the federal government .... State courts and state
legislatures are ignored. . . ."); Larry Kramer, More Notes on Methods and
Objectives in the Conflict of Laws, 24 CORNELL IIT'L L.J. 245. 260 n.50
(1991) ("Most recent scholarship on interpretation," dealing only with the
federal context is incomplete because, "Imlany issues that seem easy from a
federal perspective are less so from the states' point of view. Conversely*
issues ... controversial in the federal context may become relatively
straightforward from the perspective of the states.").
19. Judith S. Kaye, Courts, the Public and Criminal Justice. N.Y. ST.
B.J. 10 (December 1996).
1997] 599
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Legislative history is a second notable difference--and here the
tonnage is entirely on the federal side. Wherever one may come
out in the debate over the value of legislative history as an
interpretative tool--and there surely is a wide range of thinking
on the issue (I thought the new movie "Liar, Liar" was a
commentary by Judge Kozinski on legislative history) 20 --there is
much less of it at the state level.
In the federal system, debates are routinely printed in the
Congressional Record, and joint or conference committee reports
of both Houses of Congress readily obtainable. But in the states,
committee reports can take many forms, not all of them
accessible, 2 1 and floor debates are sparse. 22 In New York,
typically all the courts have are Bill Jackets containing the
Governor's approval memorandum, the Sponsor's memorandum
and assorted constituent letters. Not much of a window on
legislative intent. Passing from the physical to the theoretical, a
20. Compare SCALIA, supra note 5, at 29-38 (rejecting the use of
legislative history as unreliable, easily manipulated, and not truly reflecting the
view of the legislative branch) and LANE and MIKVA, supra note 7, at 777-785
(noting that legislative history can be easily manipulated to influence judicial
decisionmaking and calling for its careful use), with Abner J. Mikva, Statutory
Interpretation: Getting the Law to Be Less Common, 50 OHIO ST. L.J. 979,
981 (1990) ("an informed, careful use of legislative history can limit the
number of interstices that judges plug") and Stephen Breyer, On the Uses of
Legislative History in Interpreting Statutes, 65 S. CAL. L. REv. 845, 848
(1992) ("[ulsing legislative history to help interpret unclear statutory language
seems natural. Legislative history helps a court understand the context and
purpose of a statute"). On the debate generally, see United States Department
of Justice, Office of Legal Policy, Using and Misusing Legislative History: A
Re-Evaluation of the Status of Legislative History in Statutory Interpretation
(1989).
21. WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR. & PHILLIP P. FRICKEY, CASES &
MATERIALS ON LEGISLATION: STATUTES AND THE CREATION OF PUBLIC
POLICY, 710 (2d ed. 1994).
22. As one commentator noted some years ago, state legislative history is
ignored because state legislatures see no need for it. See Eric Lane, Legislative
Process and its Judicial Renderings: A Study in Contrasts, 48 U. PITT. L.
REv. 639, 651 (1987). See also City of Lafayette v Louisiana Power & Light
Co., 435 U.S. 389, 437 (1978) (Stewart, J., dissenting) ("[S]tate statutes are
often enacted with little recorded legislative history, and the bare words of a
statute will often be unilluminating in interpreting legislative intent. ").
600 [Vol 13
6
Touro Law Review, Vol. 13 [1997], No. 3, Art. 3
https://digitalcommons.tourolaw.edu/lawreview/vol13/iss3/3
THINGS JUDGES DO
third crucial difference is the way our dockets are compiled.
Absent a constitutional issue or treaty, federal courts usually have
jurisdiction only because of a dispute over a statute or regulation.
State courts are common law courts; they regularly, openly and
freely speak the language of the common law. Federal courts do
not and cannot; their jurisdiction is, ironically, curtailed by
statute.2 3
The state courts' unique role in shaping the common law is
inevitably linked to their function of interpreting statutes. In the
words of one recent commentator, we live in a "world where
common and statutory law are woven together in a complex
fabric defining a wide range of rights and duties."24 This breeds
yet a fourth significant difference-a closer relationship between
the distinctly separate branches of state government than at the
federal level.2 5
Several times, for example, the New York Legislature has
codified a rule developed by the courts as a matter of common
law. On the criminal side, a notable Court of Appeals holding as
a matter of fairness that a defendant is entitled to examine the
prior statements of a witness before that person testifies, later
23. See 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (1988) ("The district courts shall have original
jurisdiction of all civil actions arising under the Constitution. laws, or treatises
of the United States."). Indeed, Justice Scalia, in a recent Supreme Court
opinion openly declared, "there is no general federal common law."
O'Melveny & Myers v. FDIC, 512 U.S. 79, 87 (1994). In making such a
statement, Justice Scalia and the Supreme Court reaffirmed the settled rule of
Erie v. Tompkins Railroad, 304 U.S. 64, 78 (1938). See also City of
Milwaukee v. Illinois, 451 U.S. 304, 312 (1981) ("Federal courts, unlike state
courts, are not general common-law courts and do not possess a general power
to develop and apply their own rules of decision."): SCALIA, supra note 5. at
13.
24. DAvID L. SHAPIRO, CONTINUITY AND CHANGE IN STATUTORY
INTERPRETATION 937 (1992).
25. As former Connecticut Chief Judge Peters observed "[tihe state court
house is, if anything, too close to the state legislative house." Ellen A. Peters.
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was codified in the Criminal Procedure Law. 26 And on the civil
side, an entire body of statutory law affecting workers'
compensation, indemnification and contribution grew out of the
Court's decision, under the common law, in Dole v. Dow
Chemical Company.27
Common law rules, by the same token, can be modified or
rejected by the Legislature, as was the case recently with respect
to a rule precluding firefighters and police officers from
recovering damages for injuries related to the dangers of their
jobs. 28 The Legislature modified our rule by providing a cause of
action for those occupations where the defendants involved had
failed to comply with an applicable statute or ordinance. 29
Legislatures, of course, have the same ultimate "veto" power
over courts' interpretation of statutes.30 If, in their view, courts
have misread a statute, legislators can rewrite it. Indeed, on our
Court, as a matter of policy we make a special effort to achieve
consensus in statutory interpretation cases--exactly because we
26. See People v. Rosario, 9 N.Y.2d 286, 289-91, 173 N.E.2d 881, 883-
84, 213 N.Y.S.2d 448, 450-51 (1961); N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 240.45
(McKinney 1993).
27. 30 N.Y.2d 143, 151-53, 282 N.E.2d 288, 294-295, 331 N.Y.S.2d
382, 390-92 (1972); see N.Y. Civ. PRAc. L. & R. 1411 (McKinney 1976)
("In any action to recover damages for personal injury, injury to property, or
wrongful death, the culpable conduct attributable to claimant . . . , including
contributory negligence or assumption of risk, shall not bar recovery, but the
amount of damages otherwise recoverable shall be diminished in the proportion
which the culpable conduct attributable to the claimant ... bears to culpable
conduct which caused the damages. ").
28. Santangelo v. State, 71 N.Y.2d 393, 521 N.E.2d 770, 526 N.Y.S.2d
812 (1988) (police officers injured while apprehending escaped mental patient
could not recover damages against state for negligence).
29. N.Y. GEN. MUN. LAW § 205-a (McKinney 1995).
30. Not all commentators agree that this is a common event. See, e.g.,
Otto J. Hetzel, Instilling Legislative Interpretation Skills in the Classroom and
the Courtroom, 48 U. PITT. L. REv. 663, 678-79 (1987) (questioning the ease
with which "[j]udges often imply that judicial decisions can be overruled by the
legislature); see also Shirley S. Abrahamson & Robert L. Hughes, Shall We
Dance? Steps for Legislators and Judges in Statutory Interpretation, 75 MINN.
L. REv. 1045, 1054-55 (1991) ("[P]rompt legislative reaction to judicial
[statutory] interpretation is probably the exception ... not the rule.").
602 [Vol 13
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know that the Legislature can, and will, step in if it is not
satisfied with our interpretation. Although I have seen press
releases touting the Legislature's "overruling" of particular Court
decisions, a side-by-side comparison of the original and amended
statutes would make clear that in fact the Legislature has not
"overruled" the Court. It has written a new statute that makes
plain its intention. That is no insult to the Court, and no injury to
the relationship.
Often courts even engage the Legislature in open dialogue over
a statute-especially when the crucible of real-life facts
demonstrates that a statute is simply does not provide the
intended result. Some years ago, for example. the Court of
Appeals struggled with the statute of limitations for injuries
caused by harmful substances like asbestos. Because these harms
are discoverable only years after exposure, we repeatedly
expressed frustration over the unfairness of commencing the
statute of limitations on exposure to the substance. 3 1 Ultimately
the Legislature passed a law providing that the limitations period
might accrue, instead, upon discovery of the injury. 32
The dialogue continues even after adoption of the statute, as
courts begin the process of interpreting and applying the statute
in a variety of cases--for example, determining the meaning of
31. See, e.g., Thornton v. Roosevelt Hosp., 47 N.Y.2d 780. 784-85, 391
N.E.2d 1002, 1005-06, 417 N.Y.S.2d 920, 923-24 (1979) (Fuchsberg. J..
dissenting).
32. N.Y. Civ. PRAc. L. & R. § 214-c (McKinney 1990 & Supp. 19951
(initially enacted in 1986 in response to Steinhardt v. Johns-Mansville Corp..
54 N.Y.2d 1008, 1010, 430 N.E.2d 1297, 1299, 446 N.Y.S.2d 244. 246
(1981) (holding that statute of limitations begins to run at time of injury)).
1997] 603
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discovery of the injury, 33 the retroactivity of the statute, 34 and
the survival of certain common law accrual rules. 35
SIGNIFICANCE OF THE DIFFERENCES
What is the significance of all this, you ask. What is the
practical effect of the state-federal differences when it comes to
the interpretation of statutes?
I begin my answer with the recognition that, whether state or
federal, the Legislature, not the Judiciary, is the lawmaking
branch of government; that though the Judiciary has some
interstitial lawmaking function, it is the elected branches of our
State and national government, responsive to the will of the
people, that determine and set public policy. I have no quarrel
with the expression of several scholars--a category that includes
judges--that in matters of statutory interpretation, the judiciary
must bend to the legislative command. 36 That is the oath and
obligation of every judge.
33. See In re New York County DES Litigation, 1997 WL 55253 (N.Y.
February 11, 1997) (holding that discovery of injury for accrual purposes
occurs when the "injured party discovers the primary condition on which the
claim is based.").
34. See Rothstein v. Tennessee Gas Pipeline Co., 87 N.Y.2d 90, 661
N.E.2d 146, 637 N.Y.S.2d 674 (1995).
35. See Jensen v. General Electric Co., 82 N.Y.2d 77, 623 N.E.2d 547,
603 N.Y.S.2d 420 (1993) (determining the trespass and nuisance accrual rules
were not incorporated into CPLR 214-c).
36. These commentators believe that when judges are called upon to
interpret statutes, it is their "primary responsibility, within constitutional
limits, to subordinate [their] wishes to the will of Congress, because the
legislator's collective intention, however discovered, trumps the will of the
court." PATRICIA M. WALD, THE SIZZLING SLEEPER: THE USE OF
LEGISLATIVE HISTORY: A RE-EVALUATION OF THE STATUS OF LEGISLATIVE
HISTORY IN STATUTORY INTERPRETATION 6-20 (1989) (citing the quoted text
as the nearly universal view among federal judges). See also CASS R.
SUNSTEIN, AFTER THE RIGHTS REVOLUTION 113 (1990) ("[a]ll approaches to
statutory interpretation are framed by the constitutional truism that the judicial
will must bend to the legislative command. It is through the subordination of
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My concern, however, is with the next sentiment: that judges-
proper, wel-behaved judges-are obliged simply to apply the
words of statutes as they are written; that they must ask only
what statutes say and not what the drafters meant;37 that anything
beyond the technical exercise of applying sections of a code to
facts of a case smacks of activism and overreaching-in other
words, that judges are on the prowl for opportunities to wrest
ambiguity from the jaws of clarity. Based on my own experience,
I simply cannot agree that statutory interpretation is such a
mechanical exercise, or that the proper path of an honorable
judge is so confined. 38
Let me illustrate my concern by describing two situations--
there are many I assure you-from the nearly fourteen years I
have been privileged to serve on the Court of Appeals.
First, as you all know, however careful we may be in choosing
them, words-even very simple words--are rarely precise. Partly
that is human limitation, partly language limitation. 39
Sometimes, the Legislature is deliberately imprecise. 40 In those
instances, there is no need for any judge to "wrest" ambiguity
37. See Felix Frankfurter, Some Reflections on the Reading of Statutes. 47
COLUM. L. REV. 527, 538 (1947) (quoting Justice Holmes as saying. "[oinly a
day or two ago-when counsel talked of the intention of a legislature. I was
indiscreet enough to say I don't care what their intention was. I only want to
know what the words mean."); OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES. COLLECTED
LEGAL PAPERS 207 (1920) ("we do not inquire what the legislature meant, we
ask only what the statute means,"), quoted in Schwegmann Bros. v Calvert
Distillers Corp., 341 U.S. 384, 397 (1951) (Jackson, J., concurring).
38. Accord LANE and MIKVA, supra note 7, at 765 ("The fact of the
matter is judges, like law students, are not automatons. They form their own
views based on what they hear, filtered through their own sensibilities. This is
underscored by the nation's constitutional commitment to an independent
judiciary and historical common law tradition.").
39. As late Chief Judge Breitel noted, the "words men use are never
absolutely certain in meaning; the limitations of finite man and the even greater
limitations of his language see to that." Bankers Assoc. v. Albright. 38 N.Y.2d
430, 436, 343 N.E.2d 735, 738, 381 N.Y.S.2d 17, 20 (1975). See also Judith
S. Kaye, State Courts at the Dawn of a New Century, 70 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1.
29 (1995) ("issues like these that reach a state appeals court cannot be resolved
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from the enactment of a co-equal branch of government--it's
decked out in neon lights beckoning to us. Consider common
statutory phrases such as "best interests of the child," 4 1
"extraordinary circumstances, ", 4 2  "due diligence, 43 and
"prejudice. "44
But even where words on a page may seem crystal clear,
application to real-life facts adorns them with a few of those neon
lights. One of my colleagues--Chief Justice Shirley Abrahamson
of Wisconsin--offers this neat hypothetical. A statute provides
simply and unequivocally that a landlord can evict any tenant
who keeps a pet. Everyone, of course, knows what a pet is. Keep
a pet, you can be evicted. The "pet" in question, however, turns
out to be a three-inch goldfish named Tootsie, doted on by its
owner the tenant and lodged in a bowl of water. What do you,
the judge, do? Evict or not? If you think the goldfish is an easy
case, try a piranha, a python, a pitbull. How about a hamster or a
40. Indeed, there are many reasons for ambiguity. See LANE and MIKVA,
supra note 7, at 768-769 (recognizing that statutes are usually drafted in
general terms and address categories, rather than specific instances of conduct;
some legislatures deliberately leave gaps in a statute for administrative
agencies to fill; and vague language can be the result of legislative
compromise); Jane S. Schacter, Metadenocracy: The Changing Structure of
Legitimacy in Statutory Interpretation, 108 HARV. L. REV. 593, 604 (1995)
("There is growing recognition that legislators often deliberately employ
vague, symbolic, and sometimes meaningless statutory language.. . in order
to placate warring interests and achieve compromise, to please as many and
alienate as few constituencies as possible, or to avoid difficult policy choices
by postponing decision or transferring responsibility to an agency through a
broad delegation.").
41. See, e.g., In re Michael B., 80 N.Y.2d 299, 312-15, 604 N.E.2d 122.
130-32, 590 N.Y.S.2d 60, 68-70 (1992).
42. See, e.g., Yalango v. Popp, 84 N.Y.2d 601, 609, 644 N.E.2d 1318,
1323, 620 N.Y.S.2d 762, 767 (1994).
43. See, e.g., People v. Luperon, 85 N.Y.2d 71, 79, 647 N.E.2d 1243,
1247, 623 N.Y.S.2d 735, 739 (1995); People v. Bolden, 81 N.Y.2d 146. 153-
55, 613 N.E.2d 145, 149-50, 597 N.Y.S.2d 270, 274-75 (1993).
44. See, e.g., People v. Sayavong, 83 N.Y.2d 702, 709-11, 635 N.E.2d
1213, 1217-18, 613 N.Y.S.2d 343, 347-48 (1994); People v. Jackson, 78
N.Y.2d 638, 641, 585 N.E.2d 795, 797, 578 N.Y.S.2d 483, 485 (1991).
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canary?45 Those are the very next cases. If you refuse to evict,
are you wresting ambiguity from the jaws of clarity? Crossing the
line from judging to lawmaking? If you do evict-explicitly
leaving it to the Legislature to rewrite the statute if it sees fit-are
you a "citadel of technicality."
One of my favorite real-life examples is a recent case in our
Court involving a statute that simply and forthrightly stated that a
dangerous mental disorder--allowing confinement-means that
because of mental illness a defendant "currently constitutes a
physical danger to himself or others.', 46 Clear enough you say.
Unless a defendant is "currently dangerous"--meaning dangerous
at the time you, the judge, confront him-he cannot, under the
statute, be confined. Well, is a paranoid schizophrenic, found not
responsible for attempted murder, "currently dangerous" when he
is hospitalized, medicated, straitjacketed and surrounded by
armed guards?47
As it turned out, the Court of Appeals gave the term
"currently" what must have been its intended meaning: not
dangerous at the time of judicial review but foreseeably
dangerous in the future if confinement and treatment were not
continued into the future. 48 Had we interpreted the word
"currently" in its ordinary sense, we concluded we would have
been less than faithful to the underlying legislative purpose--to
protect society from potentially dangerous insanity acquitees. 49
45. Shirley S. Abrahamson, How Tootsie the Goldfish is Teaching People
to khink Like A Judge, JUDGE'S J., Spring 1982, at 12.
46. N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 330.20(1)(c) (McKinney 1995).
47. In re George L., 85 N.Y.2d 295, 302-06, 648 N.E.2d 475. 478-80.
624 N.Y.S.2d 99, 102-04 (1995).
48. Id. at 307-08, 648 N.E.2d at 481, 624 N.Y.S.2d at 105.
49. The necessity of avoiding absurd results in statutory interpretation has
been written on by another scholar: "virtually no one doubts the correctness of
the ancient decision that a statute prohibiting 'letting blood in the streets' did
not ban emergency surgery." Daniel A. Farber, Statutory Interpretation and
Legislative Supremacy, 78 GEO. L.J. 281, 289 (1989). But avoiding absurd
results is not the only reason why courts should be willing to look beyond the
plain meaning of a statute. Even Justice Scalia. who is unabashedly a
"textualist." admits that where, on the face of a statute, it is clear that the
legislature made a mistake of expression (rather than legislative wisdom). for
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Lest you think the choices are simple and my example far-
fetched, I might point out that terrific judges of other courts have
also gone the other way on this very issue, inviting the
Legislature to rewrite the statute if it wished to provide
something else. 50 That there are so many statutory interpretation
cases, to my mind, is not attributable to hungry lawyers or
power-crazed judges, or even to the inherent imprecision of
language. It's because however careful, wise and farseeing the
Legislature, the abstract words of a statute often require fitting
and tailoring when applied to real-life cases, which may be more
bizarre than anyone could possibly have imagined. Fitting and
tailoring are what judges do, and what they are supposed to do--
they make judgments. 5 1
example, using the term "defendant" where only "criminal defendant" makes
sense, judges are within their rights to correct the error. SCALIA, supra note 5,
at 20 (referring to the phenomenon of lapsus linguae [slip of the tongue] or
scrivener's error) (citing Green v. Bock Laundry Mach. Co., 490 U.S. 504
(1989)).
50. See In re Torres, 166 A.D.2d 228, 560 N.Y.S.2d 440 (1st Dep't 1990)
(concluding that "to find that defendant has a 'dangerous mental disorder' the
statute requires a showing that defendant 'currently constitutes a danger to
himself or others"' and holding that so long as defendant was medicated, he
was not currently dangerous). See also In re Francis S., 87 N.Y.2d 554, 663
N.E.2d 881, 640 N.Y.S.2d 840 (1995) (affirming Appellate Division reversal
of trial court, which had held that a medicated and confined patient was not
currently dangerous). Whether a literal reading leads to an "absurd result" is,
moreover, in the eye of the beholder. Compare People v. Alston, 88 N.Y.2d
519, 670 N.E.2d 426, 647 N.Y.S.2d 142 (1996) (interpreting N.Y. CRIM.
PROC. LAW § 270.15 (McKinney 1993), enacted to streamline the jury
selection process, to avoid bestowing a sizable tactical advantage on defendants
in the use of peremptory challenges) with id. at 530, 670 N.E.2d at 432, 647
N.Y.S.2d at 148 (Titone, J., dissenting) (concluding the most logical reading
of the statute was the one which granted such an advantage to defendants).
51. For another example of recent Court of Appeals "fitting and tailoring"
see People v. First Meridian Corp., 86 N.Y.2d 608, 658 N.E.2d 1017, 635
N.Y.S.2d 144 (1995) (construing the term "other securities" in the Martin Act,
which bars fraud in the promotion of securities for sale, to include portlolios of
numismatic coins, recognizing that a contrary holding would allow the
perpetrators of the fraud to manipulate their transactions to frustrate and thwart
the remedial protections of the statute).
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I promised two illustrations of my concern with insistence that
judges only apply statutes exactly as they are written. The first
rests on the inherent vagaries of language, the second on the
inherent vagaries of society. By this I have in mind the situation
where though the balance of a statute remains relevant, a litigant
raises a novel theory of the statute's applicability to an entire
category of cases unforeseen, if not unforeseeable, by the
Legislature. This, too, is not an infrequent event. It is here where
judges must use the same approach they would for developing the
common law, filling the gaps inevitably arising from the complex
interplay between human facts and abstract laws. That is
precisely what the Court of Appeals did in a much discussed
statutory interpretation case several years ago called Braschi 1.
Stahl Assoc.52 A plurality of the court interpreted the term
"family member" in the non-eviction provision of the New York
City rent control statute-a statute originally passed in 1946 to
alleviate the perceived housing crisis at the end of World War I-
to include the deceased tenant's homosexual partner. 53
With no statutory definition of "family" and no relevant
legislative history,54 the court looked beyond the statute to
resolve the case. 55 Basing our decision, in part, on "the reality of
family life," we concluded that "the Legislature intended to
extend protection to those who reside in households having all of
the normal familial characteristics" and, therefore, that Mr.
Braschi should have the opportunity to prove he had such a
household with his deceased partner.
52. 74 N.Y.2d 201, 543 N.E.2d 49, 544 N.Y.S.2d 784 (1989).
53. Id. at 211-13, 543 N.E.2d at 54-55, 544 N.Y.S.2d at 789-90.
54. See LANE and MIKVA, supra note 7, at 785-787 (referring to Braschi
as a "show down" question in which legislative history, plain meaning, other
provisions of the statute, and canons of construction are unable to guide the
court to a resolution).
55. Braschi, 74 N.Y.2d at 208, 543 N.E.2d at 52, 544 N.Y.S.2d at 786-
19971
15
Kaye: Things Judges Do
Published by Digital Commons @ Touro Law Center, 1997
TOURO LAW REVIEW
A few years later, we engaged in a similar exercise in
construing the adoption statutes to apply to two cases involving
adoptions by unmarried couples, one of them a lesbian couple. 56
Most recently, in Cahill v Rosa,57 the Court of Appeals was
called upon to determine whether dental offices were "places of
public accommodation" within the meaning of the anti-
discrimination provisions of the Human Rights Law. The two
dental offices in question had refused to treat HIV-positive
patients who then sued for disability discrimination. The statute
included two extensive lists of businesses and locations that were
defined either as places of public accommodation or not places of
public accommodation. 5 8 Neither list included dental offices.
Because--again--the statute's terms were ambiguous and the
legislative history unhelpful, the Court examined the broader role
in society of both the statute and dental offices and concluded that
the offices were places of public accommodation.
Most significant of all, perhaps, is the fact that a court must
resolve every dispute before it. 59 The court has to go one way or
the other, and either result necessarily involves a judge's choice,
56. In re Jacob, 86 N.Y.2d 651, 660 N.E.2d 397, 636 N.Y.S.2d 716
(1995) (holding that intra-family adoptions by second parents--including the
lesbian partner of the child's biological mother--are allowed under state
adoption statute, and remitting two cases to family court to determine whether
the particular adoptions were in the best interests of the child). For another
recent Court of Appeals case with a similar problem of statutory interpretation,
see Symphony Space v. Pergola, 88 N.Y.2d 466, 669 N.E.2d 799, 646
N.Y.S.2d 641 (1996) (concluding that the Rule Against Perpetuities applied to
commercial option agreements, as they provided the same restraints on
alienability and disincentive to improve the real property that the Rule was
designed to prevent).
57. 89 N.Y.2d 14, 674 N.E.2d 274, 651 N.Y.S.2d 344 (1996).
58. N.Y. EXEC. LAW § 292(9) (McKinney 1993 & Supp. 1997).
59. One professor noted that in such situations, "the positive law is not a
command to the judge but, at most, an authorization of alternative decisions.
Judges by and large are reluctant lawmakers, but the role is thrust upon even
the most modest of them by the realities of their function. The case must be
decided, one way or the other. Unlike the pure social scientist, the judge
cannot withhold his action until all the returns are in. There is no hiding place
from the political and moral obligation to decide." Harry W. James, An
Invitation to Jurisprudence, 74 COLUM. L. REV. 1023, 1041 (1974).
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sometimes a judge's social policy choice. 60 Had we gone the
other way in Cahill, for example, we would have decided that
persons with disabilities could not be discriminated against at
skating rinks and ice cream parlors (which were on the statutory
list of public accommodations), but that health care providers
were free to deny medical care solely on the basis of disability. 6 1
I think it is clear that common-law courts interpreting statutes
and filling gaps have no choice but to "make law" where neither
the statutory text nor the "legislative will" provides a single clear
answer. Indeed, it is my perception that state legislatures not only
accept such judicial decisionmaking as entirely legitimate, but
also expect that within defined boundaries, courts will make such
choices, which can of course then be embraced, enlarged or
entombed.62
CONCLUSION
Many today have voiced concern over "legislating from the
bench" and "judicial activism." They would, most likely, be
more comfortable if only our elected representatives made the
sensitive decisions. 63 But until words perfectly communicate
ideas, and legislatures develop the unerring ability to foresee
every application of the laws they enact, cases continue to call
upon judges to fill the gaps--and do so by reference to social
60. LANE and MIKVA, supra note 7, at 765 ("a judge naturally may resist
[a statute's] application if the consequence of that application seems absurd or
if the statute's application conflicts strongly with his or her ideology, public
policy view, or particular sense of fairness").
61. Cahill, 89 N.Y.2d at 23, 674 N.E.2d at 277-78, 651 N.Y.S.2d at 347-
48.
62. The regulators apparently agreed with us in Braschi-within months
after the decision, regulations were enacted enlarging the definition of family
member to include "[a]ny other person residing with a tenant ... who can
prove emotional and financial commitment and interdependence [with] the
tenant." See Rent Stabilization Ass'n v. Higgins, 83 N.Y.2d 156. 166. 630
N.E.2d 626, 629, 608 N.Y.S.2d 930, 933 (1993) (upholding new regulations).
The absence of any new statute signals a similar agreement in Cahill.
63. See, e.g., SCALTA, supra note 5, at 22 ("It is simply not compatible
with democratic theory that laws mean whatever they ought to mean. and that
unelected judges decide what that is.").
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justice.64 For state judges, schooled in the common law, to
refuse to make the necessary policy choices when properly called
upon to do so would result in a rigidity and paralysis that the
common-law process was meant to prevent. 65
I conclude by making explicit my underlying thesis, which I
hope was implicit throughout--and on this I suspect Justice
Scalia, Judge Kozinski and I would be in complete agreement.
Whether we are contemplating great thoughts about pizza, or
reading contracts, constitutions and statutes, it's sometimes
tough--but invariably great--to be a judge.
64. See, e.g., William N. Eskridge, Jr., Dynamic Statutory Interpretation,
135 U. PA. L. REV. 1479, 1554 (1987) (describing judges interpreting statutes
as analogous to "diplomats ... [who] must often apply ambiguous or outdated
communiquds to unforeseen situations, which they do in a creative way, not
strictly constrained by their orders. But they are, at bottom, agents in a
common enterprise, and their freedom of interpretation is bounded by the
mandates of their orders, which are not necessarily consistent or coherent over
time, or even at any one time.").
65. United States v. Standard Oil Co., 332 U.S. 301, 313 (1947)
(describing advantage of common law process as preventing law from
becoming "antiquated straight jacket and then dead letter.").
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